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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

CPLR 7502(b): Court refers "threshold question" to arbitration.
The recipient of a properly drafted notice of intention to arbitrate1 48 must apply for a stay of arbitration within ten days. 149 Otherwise, he is thereafter precluded from asserting in court that a valid
agreement had not been made or complied with.1 0 A third "threshold"
question, whether the arbitral proceedings are barred by a limitation
of time, 151 is not, however, waived by the failure to press a timely
objection; it may also be raised before the arbitrator.152 Seizing upon
this latter consideration, the court, in In re Textiles, Inc., 153 recently
held that notwithstanding a timely application for a stay of arbitration,
the determination of whether the pending arbitration is barred by a
limitation of time may, in proper circumstances, be referred to the
arbitrator.
The parties in Textiles had inserted a provision in their contract
to the effect that any action of any kind must be commenced within
one year from the date on which the claim accrued. 154 Recognizing
that the resolution of respondent's contention that the claim was timebarred might involve an intimate knowledge of trade customs, the
court chose to defer to the arbitrator's experience and judgment. Moreover, the court was also influenced by the fact that the parties had
utilized a broad arbitration clause inasmuch as it has been posited
that when such a provision is adopted, all questions except those relating to public policy should be left for the arbitrator to decide. 15
148 Under CPLR 7503(c) the notice of intention to arbitrate must contain the name
and address of the claimant and must specify the agreement pursuant to which arbitration is sought. Also, notice must be given the recipient that unless an application for a
stay of arbitration is made within ten days after such service, he will be precluded from
raising the threshold questions. Service of the notice of intention to arbitrate may be in
the same manner as a summons or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
149 Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, 31 App. Div. 2d 208, 295
N.Y.S.2d 853 (1st Dep't 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 208, 249 N.E.2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636
(1969); see also The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. Rrv. 758, 760 (1970).

150 CPLR 7503(c).
151 CPLR 7502(b).
152 Id. See Davis, Brody & Wisniewski v. Temple Emanu-El, 49 Misc. 2d 251, 267
N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1966).
It would not, however, be a good practice to ignore a notice of intention to arbitrate
with the intent to raise the limitations issue before the arbitrator since CPLR 7502(b) gives
him the discretion to refuse to hear the objection.
153 164 N.Y.L.J. 18, July 27, 1970, at 2, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
154 Such provisions are usually strictly enforced. 8 WK&SM
7502.15. See also River
Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d 545 (1953).
155 See 8 WK&M 7501.23. For a discussion of the emerging "separability" doctrine,
see Aksen, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin - What Does It Mean?, 43 ST. JOHN's L. Rv.
1, 7-8 (1968).
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Thus, the Textiles decision not only recognized the ability of the
arbitrator to deal with technical issues, but also presumably served to
effectuate the intent of the contracting parties. 5 6
Whether it was the arbitrator or the court who decided the limitations question would probably be academic were it not for the fact
that Textiles raises serious problems concerning the scope of review.
An order of the court denying an application for a stay of arbitration
on the ground that the arbitration is not time-barred is appealable; 157
a similar conclusion by the arbitrator is not reviewable. 158 Perhaps this
consideration manifests a need for legislative action. If article 75 is
indeed intended to expedite the settlement of disputes, 159 then no
appeal should be allowed from an interlocutory court order denying a
stay of arbitration. 160 In any event, under present law a party should
not be denied the avenue of appeal which is secured by a timely application to the court.
What is more importantly involved, however, is the broader question as to whether a time limitation issue should be deemed a "threshold" one. Certainly, a distinction can be drawn between allegations
that a valid agreement to arbitrate had not been made or complied
with and the contention that the arbitration is time-barred. Significantly, the Federal Arbitration Act,'"' which was patterned after the
New York statute, 162 excludes limitations questions from preliminary
judical consideration. 163 Moreover, the objection seems closely akin to
those relating to lack of mutuality'64 or fraud in the inducement; 1 5
there is no public policy which dictates that such issues be decided by
the court. 16 Finally, if the limitations defense is properly deemed
156 Cf. Exercycle Corp. v.

Maratta, 9 N.Yf2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S2d 353

(1961).
See generally 8 WK&M
7502.08.
158 See CPLR 7511.
159 See Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, 51 App. Div. 2d 208, 295
157

N.Y.S.2d 853 (lst Dep't 1968).
160 See 8 WK&M

7502.08.

1619 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964).
162 See Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A
Farrago of Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847, 854 (1960).

See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 338 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
164 See, e.g., Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d
353 (1961).
165 See, e.g., Matter of Amphenol Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 46, 266 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1965), af'd, 267 N.YS.2d 477 (1st Dep't 1966) (mem.).
166 Cf. Aimcee Wholesale Corps. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223,
289 N.YS.2d 968 (1968); Agur v. Agur, 32 App. Div. 2d 16, 298 N.YS.2d 772 (2d Dep't
1969).
163
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"threshold," then logical consistency mandates that it too be waived
by the failure to make a timely objection.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

DRL 245: Contempt unavailable until foreign judgment has been

entered in New York.
Since 1965, the family court has had the power to enforce an
order or decree granting alimony or support entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction outside the state of New York, 16 7 irrespective
of the grounds upon which it was rendered. 16 By implication, the

supreme court possesses concurrent jurisdiction over applications to
enforce such decrees and orders. 16 9 Nevertheless, a recent case, Cooperman v. Cooperman,170 indicates that other aspects of the pre-1965 enforcement procedure have remained intact.
In Cooperman, the plaintiff brought arn action in the supreme
court to have the defendant punished for contempt because of his
failure to make alimony payments under a Mexican divorce decree.
The court reasoned that, although the 1965 amendment to the Family
Court Act broadened the jurisdiction of the supreme court to include
decrees rendered on non-New York grounds, it in no way altered or
abrogated the enforcement procedure contained in DRL 245.171 Thus,
in accordance with a number of preamendment decisions, 172 the
Cooperman court concluded that the remedy of contempt was available only after the foreign decree had been reduced to a judgment of
the courts of this state.
167 N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 466(c) (McKinney supp. 1965).

168 Matter of Seitz v. Drogheo, 21 N.Y.2d 181, 234 N.E.2d 209, 287 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1967).
Prior to the 1965 amendment, the out-of-state decree could be enforced or modified only
if it was entered on grounds recognized in New York. See Griffin v. Griffin, 275 App. Div.
541, 90 N.Y.S.2d 596 (3d Dep't 1949); Kelley v. Kelley, 275 App. Div. 887, 90 N.Y.S.2d 178
(4th Dep't 1949) (mem.); see also Boissevain v. Boissevain, 252 N.Y. 178, 169 N.E. 130 (1929)
(enforcement provisions of CPA § 1172 not applicable to matrimonial decrees of foreign
countries).
169 Matter of Seitz v. Drogheo, 21 N.Y.2d 181, 234 N.E.2d 209, 287 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1967).
In Seitz it was held that the broadening of the family court's power to encompass decrees
entered on non-New York grounds was a "new class of actions and proceedings" within
the meaning of the state constitution. N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 7(c) (1962). Hence, the jurisdiction to entertain enforcement proceedings automatically vested in the supreme court.
Cf. Thrasher v. United State Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 225 N.E.2d 503, 278 N.Y.S.2d
793 (1967).
170 62 Misc. 2d 745, 809 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
171 DRL 245 is identical to CPA 1172. FOuRTH REP. 392. Hence, the latter provision
should facilitate construction of the former.
172 See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 275 App. Div. 541, 90 N.Y.S.2d 596 (3d Dep't 1949);
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 32 Misc. 2d 308, 222 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1961).

